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Abstract 
Many of today’s global environmental problems could be mitigated through large-scale 
collective action between different actors. Still, most theoretical assumptions on how collective 
action can be reached over natural resources is based on empirical work within small- to 
medium scale common-pool-resources. Thus, how large-scale collective action is achieved in 
more large and complex commons such as transfrontier conservation areas over wildlife and 
natural resources is not that evident. Focusing on the Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier 
Conservation Area in southern Africa, with the point of departure in theories about collective 
action and the literature of rule compliance, this study examines to what extent previous theories 
can explain resource user’s willingness to comply with conservation rules imposed by higher 
state authorities; an aspect that could be important in reaching large-scale collective action. 
Using a mixed-method design, the study applies public opinion data from the Afrobarometer 
on corruption and trust in local authorities and these factors’ effect on a proxy measure for rule 
compliance – deforestation on a local level. Furthermore, unique qualitative data is applied 
from interviews with elite officials and key stakeholders and their perceptions on resource 
users’ motives for following conservation rules. Vertical trust, co-management and deterrence 
strategies are suggested to be important in generating compliance. Still, transboundary 
conservation could face other challenges such as incompatible policies as well as slow 
institutional change which in turn could lower compliance. 
 
 
Keywords: Large-scale collective action, compliance with conservation rules, natural 
resource management, poaching, transboundary conservation, Southern Africa.  
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 4 
Introduction 
What challenges and opportunities are there in generating compliance with conservation rules 
by resource users in transboundary conservation and thereby reach large-scale collective action 
over wildlife and natural resources? Answering this question could contribute to the mitigation 
of ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss – important issues both in terms of conservation, 
countries’ economies and human well-being (IUCN 2016; UNEP-WCMC & IUCN 2016).   
The management of natural resources has been studied from several different 
research disciplines. In political science, the role of institutions is often highlighted i.e. how 
formal and informal rules shapes human behaviour in acting collectively over natural resources 
when limiting access and defining rights and duties (North 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999; Agrawal 
2002). While much of the empirical work has focused on how local rules and norms evolve 
among resource users and their effect in small- to medium-scale common-pool-resources such 
as forests, irrigation systems and inshore fisheries (Baland & Platteau 1996; Ostrom et al.1994; 
Schlager et al.1994; Ostrom 1990; Gibson et al. 2005; Varughese & Ostrom 2001) many of 
today’s environmental problems are of a more global and complex character.1 Large-scale 
commons such as climate change or biodiversity loss cannot be managed within one village or 
one single country. Hence the mitigation of these problems demands large-scale collective 
action between many resource users and stakeholders stretching from local to international 
levels (Ostrom et al. 1999). The involvement of many resource users with different interests 
and identities could further increase the difficulty of organizing, agreeing on and enforcing 
common rules by resource users themselves (Ostrom 1999:281). In other words, it could 
become harder for resource users to build social norms of trust and reciprocity as well as for 
resource users to uphold effective monitoring mechanisms on their own in the management of 
these large-scale commons. Resource users could thereby lose incentives for voluntary 
compliance not trusting that others will follow rules leading to an unsustainable use of the 
resource (Ostrom 1998; Mansbridge 2014). This leads to the large-scale collective action 
dilemma where a sustainable management of these large-scale commons demands cooperation 
                                                
1 A common-pool resource e.g. a lake, a forest, the atmosphere or wildlife is a natural or man-made resource from 
which it is difficult to exclude or limit consumption by users while one user’s consumption of resource units 
decrease resource units available to other people (Ostrom et al. 1994). The focus here in this study is on larger-
scale resources meaning that they straddle over a large spatial area such as wildlife and habitats thus involving 
many resource users and stakeholders. 
 
 
 5 
at several levels and between many resource users. Although the question is how to coordinate 
this and ensure cooperative behaviour between all actors involved.  
Following this, reaching large-scale collective action over natural resources could 
require the involvement of a third-party to induce rule compliance by resource-users.2 As Elinor 
Ostrom (1998:17) stated “[…] Without some external support of such [higher-level-state] 
institutions, it is unlikely that reciprocity alone completely solves the more challenging 
common-pool-resource problems”. Thus, with the ability to enact regulations (Ostrom 
2010:552), monitor illegal activities (Mansbridge 2014:8) as well as technical and material 
assistance (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; 638-639) a third party could play an essential part in 
reaching large-scale collective action. However, if the rules imposed by the third-party are not 
followed by resource users, national parks and animals are only protected formally on paper 
(Arias 2015; Branch et al. 2013; Wilkie et al. 2011). This suggests that reaching large-scale 
collective action could be dependent on resource user’s complying with rules and policies 
imposed by higher level authorities. The question is how this could be achieved.  
Previous literature has identified several potential factors affecting compliance 
with rules such as economic benefits (Becker 1968; Keane et al. 2008) moral obligations (Tyler 
2001), social norms of trust and reciprocity (Ostrom 1998), trust in the state (Ostrom & Becker 
1995) and corruption (Damaina 2002; Smith & Walpole 2005). However, as mentioned, most 
studies within the field of natural resource management have focused on compliance with local 
rules in small-to medium-scale commons (see for example Agrawal 2002; Baland & Platteau 
1996; Dietz et al. 2003). Hence, there is a lack of understanding how theories on compliance 
perform and function when scaling up to a larger setting over natural resources where the need 
of a third-party involvement is salient. In this light, this study focus on Transfrontier 
Conservation Areas (TFCA’s) – a new conservation paradigm that have evolved during recent 
decades around the world. TFCA’s imply the management of wildlife and natural resources 
over political borders i.e. between states, with the aim to increase conservation effectiveness 
(Muchapondwa & Ngwaru 2010:1). In turn, comprehending many resource users as well as 
different state actors managing wildlife and habitats over a large area, TFCA’s could be 
                                                
2 Large-scale collective action is referred to collective action over large-scale common-pool resources, although I 
use the words interchangeably.  
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regarded as large-scale collective action regimes.  These regimes offer interesting ways to 
examine how higher state institutions can be successful in ensuring compliance with 
conservation rules by resource users over large-scale commons. In other words, transfrontier 
conservation is a good case of the large-scale collective action dilemma. Following this, the 
empirical focus of the study is Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA 
TFCA), established in 2011 between Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia. This 
is the biggest TFCA in the world (the size of France), with about two million people living in 
the region and further having Africa’s biggest elephant population (KAZA 2015:14).  
The aim of the study is thus to examine how and why different factors influence 
compliance with conservation rules by resource-users in large-scale commons such as 
transboundary conservation and thereby understanding how large-scale collective action can be 
achieved.3 This study then explores empirically how well previous expectations concerning rule 
compliance perform in this transboundary setting and what needs to be revised theoretically 
when looking at large-scale collective action over wildlife and natural resources. The study thus 
contributes to the research field on collective action as well as on transboundary conservation.  
Using a mixed-method design, the study consists of two parts and both test 
previous hypotheses as well as derive new insights into the field. The first part statistically tests 
the effect of two factors i.e. trust and corruption, that have previously been identified as 
important for compliance, on a proxy measure for rule compliance – in this case deforestation 
on a local level. By using public opinion from the Afrobarometer on perceptions of government 
corruption and trust in state authorities, combined with objective measures (satellite data) on 
deforestation the study tries to understand how the local variation in these factors could explain 
rule compliance in transboundary conservation. The second part use the unique knowledge and 
expertise derived from 15 interviews performed with elite officials and key stakeholders 
working in KAZA TFCA. As there is theoretical uncertainties concerning how compliance can 
be reached when scaling up to a large-scale setting such as transboundary conservation the best 
way to explore these issues further is to talk to people that are experts on the subject. Hence, 
                                                
3 In this study, compliance refers to the adherence to rules related to natural resources utilisation and conservation 
(Arias 2015:134). Compliance could be interpreted as a dichotomy i.e. whether a person or a system adheres to 
the rules or not. In this study I follow the same definition of compliance as Arias (2015) and Sundström (2016) 
referring to a gradiation of behaviour i.e. the degree of adherence to rules e.g. when a person in general respects 
the rules, but not always.  
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through these informants’ perceptions on resource-users’ motives on compliance, the study is 
able to explore factors and mechanisms not possible to reveal through the statistical data. By 
combining these two methods the hope is to get a broader and more valid picture of the research 
problem.  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. The next section proceeds with a 
background on the emergence of TFCA’s and previous research within the field. The third 
section presents and discusses the theoretical framework focusing on collective action theory 
and further presents factors that have previously been identified as affecting compliance. 
Following this section, the aim and research questions of the study is outlined. Section five 
discusses the case of KAZA TFCA, as well as choice of method and data. In section six, the 
results from the statistical analysis as well as from the qualitative analysis is presented. 
Thereafter follows an analysis and discussion of the results. Finally, the last section outlines the 
conclusions of the analysis as well as suggestions for future research.  
 
 
Previous research on transboundary conservation 
The management of biodiversity and natural resources has over decades generated different 
management strategies to reach more successful conservation policies. Going from integrated 
conservation-development programs (ICDPs) (see for example Brandon & Wells 1992) to 
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) (see for example Blaikie 2001), 
today - transboundary natural resource management could be regarded as the new conservation 
paradigm spreading around the world (Bhatasara et al. 2013). This conservation paradigm stems 
from the concept ‘bioregionalism’ recognising that ecosystems do not coincide with political 
borders; hence when dealing with natural resources and wildlife, ecological boundaries should 
be prioritized over political boundaries. The aim is thus to expand protected areas, through the 
linkage with other countries’ protected areas, preventing habitat fragmentation and thus 
improving biodiversity and natural resource conservation (Muchapondwa & Ngwaru 2010:2).4 
Involving joint management and collaboration over natural resources and biodiversity, these 
                                                
4 Throughout this study, I will use the term TFCA’s. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
defines a TFCA as “the area or a component of a large ecological region that straddles the boundaries of two or 
more countries, encompassing one or more protected areas as well as multiple resource use areas” (SADC 2012).  
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conservation areas are further aiming at establishing peace and cooperation among countries 
(Hanks 2003; Sandwith et al. 2001). In addition, TFCA’s are suggested to generate economic 
development and enhance the livelihoods of rural communities through ecotourism and the 
inclusion of communities in natural resource management (Spenceley 2006).   
 Following the establishment of these TFCA’s, a vast research field has emerged 
trying to understand and examine the challenges and prospects for these parks to be successful. 
There is a broad field of research within ecology and biology focusing on whether TFCA’s 
improve conservation of biodiversity and other ecological aspects with mixed results (see for 
example Van Aarde & Jackson 2007; Plumptre et al. 2007; Selier et al. 2014). There are also 
researchers whom have examined the role of the state. Since NGOs, donors and companies are 
usually involved in the establishment and maintenance of TFCA’s this could have implications 
for the sovereignty of the national state as responsibilities over conservation are given to non-
state entities (Wolmer 2003; Duffy 2006; Büscher & Dietz 2005). Furthermore, whether these 
transboundary conservation areas have the potential in generating cooperation between states 
have resulted in several studies emerging from the field of international relations, with the 
departure in environmental peace-making and security theories (Ali 2007; Shaw 2003; Westing 
1998). However, most of these studies have been on a theoretical level and based on many local 
case-studies (van Amerom & Büscher 2005; Duffy 2006; King & Wilcox 2008), although there 
are some exceptions. Zibics (2003) surveys levels of cooperation within the administration of 
transboundary parks while Barquet et al. (2010) evaluates transboundary protected areas 
potential in mitigating conflicts using global data on protected areas as well as militarized 
interstate disputes - both studies indicating that TFCA’s actually could increase cooperation 
between states.  
In the other end of the spectrum, researchers have focused on TFCA’s impact on 
peoples’ livelihoods. The results indicate a somewhat dark picture where communities in some 
instances have been removed from their homes to make space for wildlife (Munthali 2007:53; 
Ferriera 2006:171) and where the demands for productive agricultural land as well as enhanced 
socio-economic conditions have not been fulfilled to the communities (Spenceley 2006:663; 
Schuerholtz & Baldus 2008), which in turn could lead to conflicts between communities since 
promised revenues and jobs are not delivered (Jones 2005:276). Finally, during recent decades 
some scholars have begun to evaluate the role of institutions such as organisational structures 
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in the establishment, maintenance and development of TFCA’s (Schoon 2007; Schoon 2013; 
Muchapondwa & Ngwaru 2010). For example, Schoon (2013) use theories on institutional 
robustness, investigating how differences in organisational structures influence collaboration 
between officials in the parks, where bottom-up approaches seem to increase cooperation 
compared to a top-down implementation of transboundary projects. 
To summarize, the field on transboundary conservation comprehends a broad 
spectrum of topics and disciplines. Although a developing field, there is still limited empirical 
work on the role of institutions in terms of how rules shape human behaviour in transboundary 
conservation. Scholars within the field of political science have for a long time recognized the 
role of institutions i.e. the role of formal and informal rules in resource users acting collectively 
over natural resources when limiting access and defining rights and duties (North 1990; Ostrom 
et al. 1999; Agrawal 2002). However, how compliance with rules by resource users can be 
achieved is something that previous studies within the field of transboundary conservation have 
overlooked. This empirical and theoretical gap is the point of departure for this study. Thus, the 
study diverges from previous research when not focusing on cooperation between states or at 
higher institutional levels such as administrations. Instead, I follow those researchers whom 
have focused on the communities i.e. the resource users. Still, previous studies at the local level 
have mainly examined the connection between conservation of natural resources and poverty 
alleviation by focusing on for example the role of tourism. In contrast, this study brings in a 
new theoretical lens from both the collective action and compliance literature. To fully 
understand how sustainable use of natural resources can be achieved in transboundary 
conservation, I argue that one must acknowledge what kind of incentive structures that induce 
people to follow conservation rules since this could influence prospects in reaching large-scale 
collective action. This entails examining the relationship between resource users and higher 
state authorities in generating adherence with rules imposed from above. In the next section, 
the theoretical underpinnings of the study will be outlined.  
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Theoretical framework 
This section examines the theoretical underpinnings of the study, with the point of departure in 
collective action theory and the role of institutions in natural resource management, then 
proceeding with reviewing previous research and theories on factors that potentially affect 
compliance. The section is concluded with a discussion of the expectations of compliance in 
natural resource management when scaling up from small-scale collective action to large-scale 
collective action. 
 
The collective action dilemma 
From a social science perspective, the management of natural resources highlights the 
importance of institutions to avoid over-exploitation of a given resource. Institutions could play 
an important role in the management of natural resources when lowering uncertainty; enhancing 
human cooperation and coordination, both through formal rules and organisational structures, 
as well as through informal norms and practices (North 1990:25).5 At the centre of this research 
field lies collective action theory, focusing on how and under what conditions cooperative 
behaviour over natural resources is possible (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2002).  This theory goes 
back to the famous work by Garret Hardin (1968) on “The Tragedy of the commons” as well 
as Mancur Olson’s (1965) work on the logics of collective action. In short, collective action 
refers to situations were decisions about costly actions are made independently but outcomes 
influence everyone involved. Hence, if humans only act in their self-interest this would lead to 
the inability to act collectively and generating sub-optimal outcomes for the collective (Ostrom 
2014:551). At the core of these models lies the so called free-rider problem. When a person 
cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits provided by others, each person is encouraged 
not to contribute to the collective’s efforts. Instead each person chooses to free-ride on the 
efforts by others (Ostrom 1990:6). This could have immense consequences for the environment 
                                                
5 Institutions are here referred to as sets of formal and informal rules and norms that shapes interactions between 
humans and between human and their environment; by constraining some activities and permitting others (North 
1990:3). Institutions are then prescriptions that humans use to organize all kinds of repetitive and structured 
interactions, straddling from interactions within e.g. families and neighbours in the community to governments 
and private firms (Ostrom 2005:3). 
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since there is always an incentive to participate in activities that are damaging rather than acting 
collectively and thus sustaining resources (Ostrom et al. 2002:19).  
Nevertheless, even though these theories give a rather dark picture of human 
behaviour both laboratory and field work find that people do cooperate over natural resources 
when building and maintaining self-governing institutions, establishing their own regulatory 
systems of local rules and norms (Baland & Platteau 1996; Agrawal 2002; Ostrom 1998:5; 
Ostrom et al. 1994; Schlager 1990). This comprehends a large empirical literature exploring 
how collective action can be achieved in small- to medium-scale common-pool-resources. For 
example, factors such as small group of resource users, well defined boundaries of the resource, 
homogeneity of identities and interests among resource users and effective monitoring 
techniques have emerged as important for cooperation (Ostrom 1998:2).6 In contrast, scholars 
have started to pay more attention to large-scale collective action when recognizing the global 
scale of many environmental problems e.g. climate change, transboundary pollutions and 
poaching of wildlife (Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom 2010; Schoon 2013). These are resources that 
cannot be managed in one village or even within one single country, involving a large number 
of resource users with different identities and interests. This in turn creates difficulties in 
building social norms of reciprocity as well as upholding effective monitoring by resource users 
themselves - making it harder to reach collective action as the prospects for voluntary 
compliance with rules decrease (Ostrom 1998; Mansbridge 2014). Thus, some type of large-
scale institutional arrangement is needed to reach cooperation in more complex and larger 
common-pool resources (Ostrom 2005:278). This has resulted in a greater attention to the 
relationship between higher level authorities and the citizens i.e. the vertical relationship, in 
generating collective action (Sjöstedt 2013; Mansbridge 2014; Sjöstedt & Sundström 2014). 
For example, the state could play an important role in large-scale collective action with the 
ability to enact regulations (Ostrom 2010), provide neutral information, monitoring compliance 
and imposing sanctions on resource users (Mansbridge 2014:8) as well as technical and material 
assistance (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; 638-639). However, even though a government imposes 
rules to overcome free-riding, the rules need to be enforced and followed by the citizens for 
                                                
6 This is just some of the important variables identified for collective action in resource management. For a more 
in-depth description see for example Ostrom 1990; Baland & Platteau 1996. 
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efficient cooperation in large-scale conservation (Ostrom et al. 2002:20; Dietz et al. 
2003:1909).  
Together, this raises questions concerning how this third-party actor can be 
successful in ensuring compliance with conservation rules in reaching large-scale collective 
action over natural resources (Dietz et al. 2003:1908). In this light, I argue that these TFCA’s 
or ‘mega-parks’ can be regarded as large-scale collective action dilemmas. Covering large 
spatial areas and fugitive resources, people are depending on a third-party involvement 
concerning e.g. enforcement, surveillance and information-sharing for them to follow rules and 
hence acting collectively in transboundary conservation. However, even though there are 
conservation rules imposed by higher state authorities, if these rules are not adhered to by 
resources users in TFCA’s, the regulatory framework becomes rather meaningless. In other 
words, protected areas are at risk of becoming so called ‘paper parks’ when only being protected 
formally on paper (Gibson et al. 2005:275). Thus, understanding how state authorities in 
transboundary conservation can ensure compliance with rules by people living within these 
areas becomes an interesting issue. In the next section, factors that have previously been 
identified within the field of motivating compliance, will be discussed in further detail.  
 
Identifying motives for compliance with conservation rules  
Following the literature on compliance with rules, two different strands emerge – theories based 
on economic models versus theories derived from a normative strand. Economic models build 
on the idea that rational individuals’ willingness to comply with rules depends on whether the 
benefits anticipated of following the rules outweigh the costs (Becker 1968). In other words, 
people’s decision to break conservation rules is based on a calculation of potential gains of 
breaking the rules versus risks of being caught by law enforcement officers. Hence, advocates 
of this economic model proclaim deterrence as a solution to rule violations, implying that 
people will only follow rules when confronted with hard sanctions, monitoring, and 
surveillance (Becker 1968:176-177; Keane et al. 2008:76). However, implementing more and 
better enforcement is a costly project (Tyler 2001:2442; Levi et al. 2009:355), especially in 
large-scale collective action settings where monitoring and surveillance could be more difficult 
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(Scholz & Lubell 1998:400). This is where the normative perspective comes in, highlighting 
possibilities for voluntary compliance through peoples’ internal values.  
Firstly, adherence to rules can be driven by people’s moral obligations, being 
more likely to adhere to rules if they perceive that these are corresponding to their moral beliefs 
and values (Tyler 2001: 2443). In addition, people’s perception of what is right or wrong can 
be driven by the moral norms of the collective (Gezelius 2004:618: Keane et al. 2008:77). 
Hence, non-compliance can be tolerated within the collective if the motive is a morally accepted 
reason e.g. breaking rules for subsistence needs (Gezelius 2004:615).  
Secondly, trust is argued to be an essential driver for human cooperative 
behaviour and compliance – both between citizens i.e. horizontal trust and between the citizens 
and the state i.e. vertical trust (Ostrom 1998; Ostrom 1990; Sjöstedt 2013). Regarding 
horizontal trust, the idea is that even though people are willing to resist from opportunistic 
behaviour, if you do not trust and have the information that others will do the same – you will 
not change behaviour since this will not generate any good (Rothstein 2000; Levi 1991). Hence, 
the emergence of norms and social rules of trust and reciprocity between people is important 
for cooperative behaviour (Ostrom 1998:2; Becker & Ostrom 1995:116). Regarding vertical 
trust, this theoretical perspective derives mainly from social contract theories, explaining how 
the authority who is the superior enforcer of institutional arrangements e.g. the state, can 
credible commit to deliver on its promises (see for example Firmin-Sellers 1995; Greif 2005). 
The importance of trust in the state can be illustrated through the vertical dilemma, where both 
actors i.e. the state and the resource users would benefit most of the situation if the state 
enforced certain rules affecting a given resource and where the resource users complied, leading 
to sustainable resource management and less monitoring costs for the state. However, due to 
the lack of a third-party involvement, none of the actors can trust that the other part will fulfil 
their commitments, resulting in the worst outcome where the government does not enforce the 
rules and where resource users do not comply, causing resource depletion (Gibson 1999:10; 
Sjöstedt 2013:619). Therefore, there is a need to establish a credible commitment and a 
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reputation of trustworthiness between the resource-users and the state to generate compliance 
with conservation rules (Rothstein 2000:483).7 
Thirdly, trust further influences the legitimacy of the enforcer. Legitimacy is 
defined as the general acceptance by the public that the law and the authority has the right to 
prescribe public behaviour (Levi et al. 2009:354). If authorities are perceived as legitimate, then 
people will feel a personal responsibility to comply with the rules voluntarily (Tyler 
2001:2443). The perceived legitimacy of the authority is linked to the justice and effectiveness 
of the outcomes of rules and the fairness and efficiency of the regulatory process (Sutinen & 
Kuperan 1999:182). The justice and effectiveness of the outcomes concerns to what extent 
people are made better off from the outcomes and further how the benefits are distributed (Levi 
et al. 2009:356). Efficiency of the process includes how fast the authority respond to a given 
problem (Sutinen & Kuperan 1999:182-183) while procedural fairness concerns people’s 
experiences of the law enforcement authority regarding the procedures through which rules are 
created and implemented (Tyler 2001: 2444; Levi et al. 2009:360). Hence, if people perceive 
that they are being treated unfairly by the authorities, this could erode legitimacy of the 
authorities and hence lowering compliance (Nielsen 2003:428). Procedural fairness is also 
important for the trustworthiness of the state. If one has been treated fairly through a procedure 
by a state department, people are more likely to trust that department once again (Murphy 
2004:190).  
In contrast to the deterrence model, the normative strand highlight the inclusion 
and empowerment of local communities into the management and decision-making of natural 
resources to improve compliance (Jentoft 1989:139; Jagers et al. 2012:974). If the moral voice 
and social influence of resource users are ignored, this could erode compliance when rules are 
not shaped such that resource users perceived them as morally justifiable (Gezelius & Hauck 
2011:443) eroding the legitimacy in state authorities (Stern 2008:201).  
Finally, corruption, recognised as ‘the unlawful use of public office for private 
gain’ (Treisman 2007:211), is one contextual factor that could influence the quality of 
                                                
7 There is a large literature on different suggested mechanisms to establish this credible commitment stretching 
from professional bureaucracy (Rauch & Evans 2000), fragmentation of power (Falaschetti & Miller: 2003), 
regime type such as democracy (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006) to the quality of government i.e. the efficiency of 
institutions (Rothstein & Teorell 2008).  
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government i.e. the efficiency of the institutions (Rothstein & Teorell: 2008; Rothstein 2011; 
Levi et al. 2009), and hence outcomes of the management of natural resources.8 Corruption 
could hinder enforcement, monitoring and compliance with regulations when public officials 
are bribed by evaders to avoid responsibility and thus hampering the implementation of 
environmental policies (Damania 2002; Smith & Walpole 2005; Sundström 2013).  
  To summarize this theoretical section, there are both factors including motives 
for compliance at an individual level, which in turn can be depending on group properties such 
as social norms of trust and reciprocity, as well as contextual factors such as trust in the state 
and level of corruption within higher enforcement authorities affecting compliance. The field 
is further rather developed in terms of what factors that influence people’s willingness to 
comply with rules. However, when applying these theories into the context of a large-scale 
collective action dilemma over natural resources such as transboundary conservation, the 
expected outcomes could be more uncertain due to some inherent structures in large-scale 
commons. In the next section, I will discuss and develop my argument why compliance by 
resources users could be harder to achieve in transboundary conservation, and thus why this 
needs to be investigated further.  
 
Compliance in a large-scale collective action setting 
Previous theories on what factors that influence resource-users’ willingness to comply with 
conservation rules are to a large degree based on field-studies in small to medium-scale 
common-pool resources. However, when scaling up from small-scale to large-scale collective 
action the outcomes of these theories are not equally evident. I argue that this is due to several 
aspects that are inherent in large-scale collective action regimes over wildlife and natural 
resources such as transboundary conservation, relating to resource characteristics, resource 
users’ characteristics, the external environment and institutional arrangements (Gibson et al. 
2005:274).  
                                                
8 In this study, I’m referring to small-scale corruption i.e. petty or collusive corruption, when bribes are given to 
enforcement officers to avoid sanctions or penalties from illegal activities. Grand or non-collusive corruption 
concerns when people must pay bribes to receive e.g. public services, documents or permits, which they are legally 
entitled to without having to pay bribes (see for example Smith et al. 2003).  
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Firstly, according to previous research, making resource users follow rules is 
facilitated through the resources having well-defined boundaries (Ostrom 1998:2) since this 
lowers the monitoring costs and makes it easier to gather information on the resource stock 
(Ostrom 2005:261). In contrast, transboundary conservation comprehends fugitive wildlife that 
straddles over political borders – hence the boundaries of the wildlife are hard to define and 
enforce. Resource users are then only able to regulate a smaller part of the larger-scale common. 
This could make them lose their incentives to restrict their own use of the resources since other 
people from outside can extract from the resources. The overharvest could then also be 
intensified as resource users lack information about the resource stock and are thus not able to 
determine a sustainable harvest of the resource (Dietz et al. 2003:1908; Ostrom 2005:283).  
Secondly, transboundary conservation between several countries includes a high 
number of resource users with a variety of interests and identities; factors that have been argued 
to lower compliance with conservation rules since mitigating prospects for creating and 
maintaining shared norms of trust and reciprocity (Ostrom 1999:281). Here, face-to-face 
communication and dense social networks are important factors in building shared norms 
between resource users and hence inducing rule compliance (Dietz et al. 2003:1908). I argue 
that establishing social norms concerning resource-use would be difficult in transboundary 
conservation when resource users that manage the same resource, are spread over countries, 
making social interactions harder to achieve. This could then make it more difficult for state 
authorities generating voluntary compliance by resource users in transboundary conservation. 
Thirdly, transboundary conservation comprehends several partner countries 
which could diverge on social, economic and cultural contextual factors. Hence, the same rules 
could have different effects on the management of wildlife and natural resources depending on 
these variations in contextual factors (Agrawal 2002:45). This in turn raises questions of how 
these contextual disparities affect the incentive structure for resource users to comply with rules 
when sharing and managing the same resources.  
Fourthly, previous research have found that excluding outsiders at a relatively low 
cost is essential for people to follow rules. Outsiders usually lack an understanding of the local 
rules inducing illegal activities which would make other people participate in rule-breaking 
when not being able to deter free-riding behaviour (Dietz et al. 2003:1908). In transboundary 
conservation, I would argue that since there are open political borders, people from other 
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countries could easily go into other countries for illegal harvest and then return to their country 
– making it hard for people to exclude outsiders. Hence, since locals would be lacking the 
capacities to exclude outsiders this give them no incentives to restrict their own use (Agrawal 
& Gibson 1999:640).  
Finally, these aspects points toward the importance of involving a higher third-
party with the ability to enforce rules, information sharing and monitoring. This in turn brings 
in the second level of complexity of achieving compliance by resource users in this large-scale 
setting. Transboundary conservation could be regarded as a multilevel system of institutions 
comprehending several different actors from communities to public agencies, on different 
levels i.e. from local, and national to regional and international (Duffy 2006:92).  This large 
number of participants increases the difficulty of organizing, agreeing and enforcing common 
rules (Ostrom 1999:281). In other words, acting collectively on conservation towards a 
common goal could be a collective action problem itself. More people needs to be consulted at 
different levels and over borders and consensus between these actors must further be reached 
on all decisions, compared to the management of small-scale commons within one single 
country (Muchapondwa & Ngwaru 2010:5; Ostrom 1999:278). Hence, I argue that if 
collaboration is not achieved within higher institutional levels, there is a risk of imposing 
different constraints on resource users e.g. different rules from state authorities, eroding 
prospects for large-scale collective action over wildlife and natural resources in the region.  
Following these insights, there is a lack of understanding how theories on 
compliance perform and function when scaling up to a setting such as transboundary 
conservation, with many resource users and where the need of a third-party involvement is 
salient. Hence, I argue that to understand how large-scale collective action can be achieved one 
needs to acknowledge how and what factors that influence resource users’ willingness to follow 
conservation rules. Considering that there are many environmental problems that are of global 
character, this is a triggering and relevant issue that needs more in-depth analysis. These 
insights are the ground pillars for the research questions and aim of the study, which will be 
outlined in the next section.   
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Aim and research questions  
Following previous research, our understanding of which factors that generate compliance with 
conservation rules in reaching large-scale collective action over wildlife and natural resources 
is underdeveloped, both theoretically and empirically. The overall aim of the study is thus to 
examine how and why different factors influence compliance with conservation rules by 
resource-users in large-scale collective action settings such as transboundary conservation. 
Thus, the study is based on the following questions: 
 
- How is compliance by resource users achieved in large-scale collective action dilemmas 
such as transboundary conservation?  
- What are the causal mechanisms at work in realising compliance with conservation 
rules by resource users in large-scale collective action dilemmas such as transboundary 
conservation?  
 
In order to realise this aim, I first examine the effect of two factors i.e. trust and corruption, that 
have previously been identified as important for compliance, on a proxy measure for rule 
compliance – in this case deforestation on a local level. Thereafter, since there is both an 
empirical gap and theoretical uncertainties concerning how compliance can be reached in a 
transboundary conservation, in a next step I use the unique expertise by elite officials and key 
stakeholders to explore this issue further. 
 
 
Method and data 
In this section, method and data of the study will be outlined and discussed. The first part 
describes the empirical case and research design of the study. The next section focuses on the 
quantitative analysis, discussing method and data, followed by a discussion of the qualitative 
analysis on the same issues.  
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The case of KAZA TFCA 
The empirical focus of this study is the Kavango Zambezi (KAZA) transfrontier conservation 
area (TFCA) located in southern Africa - a region where the concept of TFCA’s have grown 
rapidly with 18 parks established or in the development stages (SADC 2012).9 Situated in the 
Okavango and Zambezi river basins, the KAZA TFCA is the world’s largest transfrontier 
conservation area with the size of France (520.000 square kilometres) and a collaboration 
between Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana and Namibia (KAZA TFCA MIDP 2015:10) 
(see map in Appendix). The park was formally established in 2011 with the overarching goal 
“[…] to sustainably manage the Kavango Zambezi ecosystem, its heritage and cultural 
resources based on the best conservation and tourism models for the socio-economic well-being 
of the communities and other stakeholders in the region.” (KAZA TFCA MIDP 2015:2). Except 
for each country’s national actors, KAZA TFCA includes its own organisation with the 
Ministerial Committee, the Committee of Senior Officials, The Joint Management Committee, 
the National Committee and finally the Secretariat which is responsible for the day-to-day 
operations in the region (ibid:14). This organisation scheme of KAZA TFCA is illustrated in 
figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Organization scheme  
 
 
 
Comment: Organisation scheme over KAZA TFCA and the different actors within the project.  
                                                
9 These TFCAs are at different implementation stages, and are further divided into three categories: Category A: 
TFCAs with a treaty or other form of legally binding agreement. Category B: TFCAs with a MoU agreement. 
Category C: TFCAs at a conceptual stage. The KAZA TFCA belongs to Category A (SADC 2012).  
National 
institutions
Transboundary instititions
Resource users
 
 
 20 
 
Covering an immense area, the TFCA includes a variety of land uses with 20 National Parks, 
85 Forest Reserves, 22 Conservancies, 11 Sanctuaries, 103 Wildlife Management Areas and 11 
Game Management Areas (ibid:10). Furthermore, there are up to date about two million people 
living within the area. This high population density, together with high poverty levels and an 
abundance of different wildlife species e.g. Africa’s largest elephant population (250.000 
elephants), have caused increasing levels of human-wildlife conflicts especially where 
unprotected areas is adjacent to protected areas (ibid; Peace Parks 2016).10 Furthermore, even 
though there are no official numbers, the Master Integrated Development Plan of KAZA TFCA, 
states that poaching is prevalent in several areas of the region (KAZA TFCA MIDP 2015:22). 
To summarize, the region encompasses many people as well as an abundance of wildlife 
straddling over a large-spatial area between five countries, making it hard for people to exclude 
other users from the consumption of wildlife and natural resources. In the same time, the KAZA 
TFCA comprehends actors at different governance levels, both transboundary, national and 
local actors with their own policies aiming at together governing wildlife and natural resources 
over borders. These aspects illustrate the large scale collective action dilemma of how state 
authorities could make people comply with conservation rules in reaching a sustainable use of 
wildlife and natural resources; which is the focus of this study. 
Overall, the case study approach was chosen since complex phenomena can be 
investigated in its real-life context while at the same time data collection and analysis are guided 
by previous theoretical propositions. In other words, the case study is used to cover contextual 
conditions that are thought to affect the phenomena in centre of the study (Yin 2009:13). This 
makes it suitable for this study since I believe that there are several conditions inherent in the 
structure of transboundary conservation that make it harder to achieve compliance by resource 
users. A case-study thus makes it possible to disentangle how previous identified factors of 
compliance perform in this context. This case should thus be viewed as a “critical-least-likely-
case”, when testing previous theories on compliance in a complex context i.e. a large-scale 
                                                
10 Human-wildlife conflict refers to the interaction between wild animals and people resulting in negative 
consequences for either the people and their resources or for the animals and their habitats. This is usually due to 
increased human populations interfering with wildlife territory, leading to a competition over scarce resources, 
generating destroyed crops, injuries or risks of both peoples’ and animals’ life (KAZA TFCA MIDP 2015). 
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collective action setting. In other words, if the results would still follow the expected outcomes, 
this would strengthen the theories since the suggested factors still seem to have an effect in a 
rather unfavourable context (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 163). Furthermore, in relation to other 
transboundary regimes, for example so called “Transboundary Parks” (TP), where two 
countries collaborate over borders including only two national parks (SADC 2012), one would 
expect it to be harder in KAZA TFCA to make people comply, with more actors and different 
protection regimes involved. Finally, it should be highlighted that this is still a case-study and 
to strengthen the results and increase the external validity, testing the same theoretical model 
in other cases of large-scale collective action over natural resources is needed. 
 
Research design  
The empirical analysis of this study applies a mixed-method design i.e. both a statistical 
analysis as well as a qualitative analysis. In other words, to get a more complete picture of the 
subject and to bring robustness to the results of the study, I treat the different methods separately 
although taking both results into account when drawing conclusions of the study i.e. a 
convergent parallel design (Creswell & Clark 2011:70). This design was chosen for several 
reasons. Firstly, the statistical part examines to what degree levels of trust and corruption in 
state authorities influence rule compliance within KAZA TFCA and is thus theory-testing when 
applying previous identified drivers of compliance from theory and testing them on an empirical 
material (Esaiasson et al. 2012:40). The reason for including this statistical part is then to 
investigate whether these factors influence compliance in large-scale collective action regimes 
such as KAZA TFCA. Compared to the qualitative data, the statistical analysis can detect 
patterns over time and over a larger unit of analysis increasing the external validity of the results 
of the study (ibid:346). Hence, the statistical data could capture local variations in corruption 
and trust, not possible using solely interviews. However, with the best data available, the 
statistical analysis is only able to examine a potential causal relationship between two previous 
identified factors of compliance hence giving a rather narrow perspective on rule compliance 
in transboundary conservation.  
In contrast, the second part of the empirical analysis, applies a qualitative 
approach based on interviews with elite officials and key stakeholders operating in KAZA 
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TFCA. Since there is a lack of studies examining compliance in large-scale collective action 
over wildlife and natural resources, focusing solely on statistical data and operationalisations 
based on previous known phenomenon this could leave out valuable data in terms of 
mechanisms that has not previously been identified in theory. Qualitative data is in this way 
suitable when exploring a new phenomenon and where, as in this case, the context plays a 
central role in the study (Marshall & Rossman 2016:101,161). Finally, while the statistical 
analysis focuses solely on compliance with rules concerning deforestation, the interviews 
highlight compliance with rules also linked to wildlife. Including both types of resources is 
important for the study since research have found that the physical characteristics of the 
resource such as degree of mobility increase resource users cost of gathering information about 
the resource, coordinate benefits from the resource and ability to exclude others from extraction 
of the resource (Schlager et al. 1994:295). In other words, different resources could generate 
different incentive structures for rule compliance by resource users. Overall, together the 
quantitative and qualitative perspectives allow a broader picture of the phenomena of the study.  
  
Statistical regression analysis  
The first part of the empirical analysis consists of a statistical regression analysis. This part tries 
to detect to what degree levels of corruption and trust in state authorities influence compliance 
with conservation rules, and more specifically forestry rules. The choice of including solely 
these factors into the statistical analysis is based on data availability and how well factors can 
be captured through statistical data. Since the dependent variable is on a continuous scale and 
not dichotomous, an OLS regression is suitable to test the relationship instead of a logistic 
regression (Field 2013:265). Thereby it is possible to test a linear relationship between an 
independent and dependent variable, where one assumes causality between them (ibid:210). 
The unit of analysis is all counties (or the corresponding second administrative level) from each 
country identified to be located within or partly within the boundaries of KAZA TFCA - in total 
30 counties. This in turn includes 616 respondents from the Afrobarometer from where the data 
on the independent variables derives from. The variables from the Afrobarometer are then 
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aggregated to the county-level by taking the mean of the respondents’ answers in each county.11 
Regarding the dependent variable i.e. deforestation, a percentage change in tree cover loss for 
the time period 2011-2015 is calculated from the original data loss in hectare for year and 
county.12 The independent variables cover the years 2008/2009 while the dependent variable is 
from 2010 and onwards. In this way, the hope is to better show cause and effect rather than to 
simply test the correlation between the variables.  
Having such a low number of units of analysis with some counties only including 
8 respondents, is evidently a limitation of the study affecting the statistical power of the results 
and possibilities for generalizing the results. Furthermore, Angola has not been surveyed in the 
Afrobarometer and is thus not included into this analysis. Even though a weakness, excluding 
Angola could be an even tougher test for the theories of compliance, since Angola suffers from 
higher levels of corruption in relation to the other partner countries (Transparency International 
2016). If for example, levels of corruption influence tree cover loss when excluding Angola, 
this would give some further robustness to the results. Altogether, the statistical analysis has 
several weaknesses concerning both internal and external validity. In turn, I have decided to 
only test for bivariate correlations. However, this is the best statistical data available for the 
region of KAZA TFCA that captures resource user’s compliance with conservation rules. This 
could thus be viewed as a first step in measuring compliance in the region of KAZA TFCA, 
which could be complemented further when data with a higher coverage and reliability is 
available. Following this, the validity of the results from the statistical analysis is evidently 
depending on how well the theoretical concepts can be operationalized and measured 
(Aneshensel 2013:24). This will be outlined and discussed below for the variables included in 
the analysis.  
 
 
                                                
11 To make the individual data from the Afrobarometer correspond to the data of the dependent variable each 
respondent has been geo-located to the second administrative level they live in. This strategy is then based on the 
assumption that attitudes in the Afrobarometer could capture the general attitudes by the resource users in each 
county. 
12 This calculation is based on the extent numbers of tree cover in hectare for the year 2010 for each county. 
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The dependent variable  
The dependent variable in the statistical analysis is compliance with forestry rules, which is 
operationalized as deforestation. This is measured by using percentage change in tree cover loss 
for each county located within or partly within the boundaries of KAZA TFCA for the time-
period 2011-2015. The data was provided by the organisation Global Forest Watch (GFW), 
although deriving originally from satellite imagery by Hansen et al. (2013).13 Percentage 
change in tree cover loss is thus meant to function as a proxy for compliance with forestry rules. 
If people choose not to comply with forestry rules and hence harvest timber illegally, this would 
increase deforestation rates.14 Thus, counties with a low percentage change in tree cover loss 
are regarded as having higher levels of compliance with forestry rules, while high percentage 
change in tree cover loss signals low levels of compliance.  
Applying an outcome variable to capture compliance both has its downsides and 
strengths. Validity problems increase with the distance between the theoretical definition and 
the operational indicator (Esaiasson et al. 2012:59). Hence, using an outcome variable as 
dependent variable increase the risk of omitted variables. However, by applying an objective 
outcome measure such as satellite imagery, the analysis captures the actual consequences of 
not adhering to rules. Many studies within the field of compliance use people’s willingness to 
comply with rules as a measure for rule compliance (Sundström 2016). Although being closer 
to the theoretical definition, stated intentions do not necessarily correspond with actual 
behaviour. Considering this, the choice of using deforestation as a proxy for compliance with 
conservation rules is still considered valid.  
 
                                                
13 The data on tree cover loss is not equal to ’net change’ in tree cover since the data does not account for tree 
cover gain. However, the gain numbers are very small in relation to numbers of tree cover loss, and would probably 
not change the results if included in the regression analysis. In addition, according to Global Forest Watch, the 
methods for data collection of tree cover loss can vary for each year which could influence the internal validity of 
the results.  
14 Although diverging to some extent between the countries, in general, harvesting of trees either demands a 
specific license or is totally forbidden concerning several ‘classified’ species of trees within national parks and 
forest reserves in KAZA TFCA (see Jones 2008). Still, counties could be in an area where harvest of trees is legal, 
which would then affect the validity of the results. This is something that should be considered when drawing 
conclusions. 
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The independent variables  
The data for the independent variables derives from the Afrobarometer round 4 2008/2009 
(Afrobarometer 2017).15 To capture trust in higher authorities and level of corruption, I apply 
items used by Wig & Tollefsen (2016) and Knutsen et al. (2016) whom have used these as a 
measure of local quality of government. Hence, the following items are included into the 
statistical analysis: 
 
• Trust in local politicians: This is measured through the question “How much do you 
trust each of the following or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?: Your 
Elected Local Government Council” with responses ranging from 0 to 3, where 0 equals 
“Not at all” and 3 equals “A lot”. 
• Trust in courts: This is measured the same way as trust in politicians, applied to courts. 
• Corruption of local politicians: This item is based on the question: “How many of the 
following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say?: Your Elected Local Government Council” with responses ranging 
from 0 to 3 where 0 equals “None of them” and 3 equals “All of them”.  
• Corruption of police: This is measured through the same question as corruption of local 
politicians, applied to the police.  
 
Qualitative analysis  
Since research is lacking on how factors influence compliance with conservation rules in a 
large-scale setting the best way to explore these issues further is to talk to people through 
interviews (Esaiasson et al. 2017:263). In this way, the risk decreases of leaving out dimensions 
that could not be understood in beforehand from theory. Together with three other researchers, 
I participated in a field trip to KAZA TFCA. Hence, 15 interviews with elite officials were 
conducted between the 30th of January and the 5th of February.16  
                                                
15 The respondents in the survey are stratified and sampled on the first administrative level meaning that the second 
administrative level, which is the unit of analysis in the statistical analysis, is not representative of the respondents. 
However, this is the best available data there is for these African countries, making it suitable to use in this study. 
16 An overview of the interviews regarding country and date can be found in Appendix.  
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Sampling of interviewees 
The interviews are based on the knowledge and expertise from elite officials working within 
KAZA TFCA. Interviewing elites has many advantages when valuable information can be 
gained due to their knowledge on management systems, legal and organisational structures as 
well as the future and history of the organisation (Marshall & Rossman 2016:159). The 
interviewees were then chosen based on centrality. In other words, since the elite officials are 
responsible for conservation projects within the region, with tasks encompassing the 
coordination, facilitation and implementation with conservation projects they are assumed to 
possess information and expertise about the field of study. Through two people living in the 
region whom are involved in the research project, the interviews included both people 
positioned within different state departments and NGO:s, working within different fields of 
conservation such as community involvement, tourism, conservation of wildlife and natural 
resources and law enforcement.  
 
The structure of the interviews 
The interviews were semi-structured meaning that an interview guide covering different themes 
were prepared in beforehand, including open-ended questions enabling the interviewee to talk 
freely about issues.17 In this way, new ways of understanding the themes or other mechanisms 
that could not be assumed in advance was possible to capture in the interviews. Furthermore, 
since the elite officials varied in their expertise in specific areas specific themes were more 
discussed in some interviews compared to others. Other questions were also added as more 
interviews were done when new aspects occurred that could not have been understood in 
beforehand. The structured themes in the interview guide were connected to the questions and 
aim of the study, relating to previous research within the field of collective action over natural 
resources i.e. international collaboration between the states such as policy harmonisation; 
national institutions and differences in bureaucratic capacities; local level cooperation such as 
the role of trust; enforcement strategies; monitoring and evaluation of conservation 
effectiveness; and the goals and challenges of KAZA TFCA.  
                                                
17 For the complete interview guide see Appendix. 
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To make the elite officials more inclined to participate in the interviews, they were 
all informed about the research project, the purpose of their participation, and what kind of 
topics that they would be asked during the interview, which is in line with recommendations 
when interviewing elite officials (Lilleker 2003:2009). They were also ensured that their 
participation would be anonymous and that the interviews would be used solely for scientific 
use. The interviews were held in English, which is the official language for all the countries 
visited, thus no third-party in terms of an interpreter was present during the interviews. All the 
interviews except for one was performed with a record device, decreasing the risk of errors 
when transcribing, and hence ensuring the reliability of the material. In some interviews, all the 
researchers participated, while others were done in pair or with one researcher solely. The 
interviews varied in length although most interviews lasted for about one hour.18 
 
Reliability of the interviewees 
Following the interviews, I believe all informants to be trustworthy in their answers. However, 
since these interviews can be considered elite interviews the interviewees could be very skilled 
in choosing an appropriate narrative when discussing different themes which could lower the 
credibility of the information (Marshall & Rossmann 2016:159). It could be the case that these 
elite officials would feel a resistance against revealing potential obstacles with implementation 
of different conservation programs not wanting to discredit KAZA TFCA as a project or their 
field of responsibility. To increase the credibility of the results, we tried to make sure that 
themes were critically examined during the interviews by being prepared and well-informed on 
the subjects and region, following up different kinds of reasoning with further detailed 
questions and critically discussing different issues. However, in general, the elite officials 
talked rather openly about issues and potential obstacles with making people support and follow 
conservation rules – increasing the credibility of their considerations.  
                                                
18 The analysis of the interviews was done in several steps. Firstly, the interviews were transcribed and thereafter 
read through to get an overview over them and comments and key words were written in the margin as a first stage 
of interpreting the material. The second step concerned coding quotes that were connected to and could explain 
rule compliance hence being able to disentangle similarities and patterns between the informants as well as making 
cross-references. Thereafter, a work of trying to build a consistent picture of what factors that influence compliance 
and potential mechanisms was done.   
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Limitations  
Even though the elite officials were strategically sampled, one cannot exclude the possibility 
that additional interviews would have illuminated new elements relevant for this study. 
Furthermore, there is a risk of missing out on important aspects when the material is based on 
elite official’s expertise on resource user’s willingness to comply; hence not based on the 
experiences of resource users’ themselves. This is considered a valid critique of the material. 
However, interviewing resource users in the region would have demanded a specific permission 
from higher authorities implying more time and resources which was not possible in relation to 
the time-frame of this study. Hence, considering the in-depth knowledge that the elite officials 
encompass over the field, this is still regarded as a valid approach for the study.  
 
 
Results  
Results from the quantitative analysis 
This section presents the results from the statistical analysis. In Table 1 the descriptive statistics 
of all the variables is shown. The results are then presented in Table 2 including four different 
models. Since the data is already limited in its scope and comprehend issues concerning 
reliability, the models only consist of bivariate correlations.19 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 N (Counties) Mean Sd. Min. Max. 
Forest loss 2011-
2015 (%) 
30 0.336 0.343 0.032 1.344 
Corruption local 
government 
30 1.10 0.310 1 2 
Corruption Police 30 1.53 0.510 1 2 
Trust court 30 1.00 0.525 0 2 
Trust Police 30 1.23 0.504 0 2 
Trust local 
government 
30 1.57 0.504 1 2 
 
 
                                                
19 See Appendix for correlation matrix of all the variables. 
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In model 1 the bivariate correlation between corruption within the local government and tree 
cover loss is tested, showing a positive correlation with a beta-coefficient of 0.251. However, 
the effect is insignificant and the R2 is very low (0.050) implying that the fit of the regression 
model is very low. Model 2 test the relationship between the independent variable corruption 
within the police and the dependent variable percentage tree cover loss i.e. deforestation for the 
period 2011-2015, finding a positive relationship with a beta-coefficient of 0.321 and the effect 
is significant at the 99 percent level. Hence, one unit increase in corruption among the police 
show a 0.321 percentage deforestation over the period 2011-2015. The R2 is rather high (0.226) 
meaning that 22.6 percent of the total variation in the dependent variable deforestation can be 
explained by corruption within the police. In model 3, the relationship between trust in the court 
and deforestation is tested, finding a positive effect with a beta-coefficient of 0.304. The effect 
is further statistical significant at the 99 percent level. Hence, one unit increase in the 
independent variable show a 0.304 percentage deforestation for the period 2011-2015. Since 
the variables of trust are recoded to facilitate the interpretation of the results a one unit increase 
in the independent variable means less trust in the court. The R2 of model 3 is somewhat lower 
than in model 2 when 21.7 percent of the variation in the dependent variable deforestation can 
be explained by trust in the court. Finally, model 4 tests the effect between trust in the local 
government and deforestation. Yet, the effect is insignificant with a low R2 hence the fit of the 
regression model is very low.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
Table 2. OLS Regression analysis of the relationship between trust, corruption and compliance 
with forestry rules. 
Dependent variable: change tree cover loss 2011-2015 (%) 
 Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. 
Corruption Local 
Government 
0.251 
(0.207) 
   
Corruption Police  
0.321*** 
(0.112) 
  
Trust Court   
0.304*** 
(0.109) 
 
Trust Local 
Government 
   
-0.011 
(0.175) 
Intercept 
0.059 
(0.236) 
-0.156 
(0.181) 
0.032 
(0.123) 
0.353* 
(0.211) 
R2 0.050 0.226 0.217 0.000 
N (Counties) 30 30 30 30 
Source: Afrobarometer round 2008/2009; Hansen et al. 2013. Comment: Standard Error in parentheses, significant level: 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. To make the results easier to interpret, the variables concerning trust i.e. “How much do you trust 
each of the following or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?; Your Elected Local Government Council/Court” were 
recoded were 0 equals “A lot” and 3 equals “Not at all”.  
 
Summarizing the results, both corruption in the police and trust in the court 
indicated statistical significant results at the 99 percent level with high R2. With the assumption 
that attitudes in the Afrobarometer capture the general attitudes by the resource users in each 
county, the results give some support to previous theories i.e. resource user’s lowered trust in 
state authorities as well as increased levels of corruption among public officials could mitigate 
levels of compliance with forestry rules. However, these results do not give any insights 
concerning how the real deforestation numbers in hectare differ between the counties. The 
statistical analysis is further only able to confirm a correlation and a potential causal 
relationship with the risk of leaving out omitted variables. To capture a more developed picture 
of how compliance can be achieved in large-scale collective action over wildlife and natural 
resources, qualitative data is needed. In the next section, the results from the interviews will be 
presented.  
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Results from the qualitative analysis  
The following section illustrates different factors impact on compliance within KAZA TFCA 
and why these factors would influence resource-users’ willingness to comply with conservation 
rules. Although this study is not able and neither aiming at detecting how common rule-
breaking is in the region, following the interviews, it becomes evident that rule breaking in 
terms of poaching of both wildlife and natural resources is a challenge facing KAZA TFCA. 
There are further mainly two different types of poaching apparent in KAZA TFCA: poaching 
for subsistence needs such as fishing, harvest of trees or hunting for the livelihoods of the locals, 
and commercial poaching of ivory where poachers either come from outside or where locals 
are paid by actors connected to the ivory market to hunt elephants and rhinos for their trophies. 
Based on the descriptions from the interviewees, the following factors connected to compliance 
was identified:  
 
Compliance due to trust in state authorities  
Relating back to previous theories, a uniform picture from the interviews emerges suggesting 
that resource user’s trust in state authorities plays an important part in reaching voluntary 
compliance with conservation rules in KAZA TFCA, where trust in the state officials in many 
cases appears to be lacking. State officials are for example acting both as facilitators for 
conservation as well as the police, arresting people for illegal activities which could decrease 
the trustworthiness in the state officials. As one elite official describes it:  
 
How would they [the communities] trust us [the state authorities] if we say 'Ok, fine we are partners in this' and 
there is no system that makes them believe that they are partners? And within the same departments we have 
people who wear the same uniform, like mine, who go and kick them and put them into jail on massive species 
of poaching. And then the following day they go and say: 'Let’s work together, let’s join hands and conserve 
together'. So, it takes a lot to win that trust. (Interview 3) 
 
The primarily reason for this lack of trust seems to be related to the absence of a functional 
system of benefit-sharing. To start with, one of the underlying factors regarding why people 
participate in poaching in KAZA TFCA seems to be poverty. People appear to break 
conservation rules due to pure subsistence needs or for economic gains from commercial 
poaching to uplift their livelihoods.  
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I poach because I’m hungry. I poach because I want fish. I want money. So, at the end of the day, for our natural 
resources to strive and not being depleted, we have to address the issue of poverty. Because poverty is the main 
driver of poaching. (Interview 1)  
 
The interviewees then describe how state authorities such as rangers, law- and wildlife 
departments would gain trust from people if establishing a system of benefit-sharing in return 
for people protecting wildlife and natural resources. Benefits refer to material issues that could 
enhance the livelihood of the resource users e.g. new jobs, building of schools, provision of 
electricity, or crafts in protecting live-stocks. One elite official describes the relationship in the 
following way:  
 
If they [the communities] don't see any benefit in whatever you [the state authority] are doing, whether it's 
research, whether it's community development, it's going to be very hard for them to accept you. But I think it 
basically comes down to, trying to gain their trust first. You have to gain their trust first and you really have to 
work hard to explain to them in the simplest terms what they can benefit out of what you are doing and what 
you want to achieve out of that. (Interview 4) 
 
Since human-wildlife conflicts are common in the region with incidents of people getting their 
crops destroyed or even harmed themselves by wildlife, the interviews report a situation where 
there is a lot of anger and frustration involved when people are being told to protect the same 
animals that are causing their properties or even themselves damage. Consequently, it appears 
that if people trust that they will receive benefits from protecting wildlife and natural resources, 
this could make people value resources higher and thus have incentives for investing time and 
resources in conservation.  
 
[…] Because really our task at the moment, as far as wildlife is concerned, is to try and change people's attitudes 
towards our wildlife, from being... right now it's just a nurturance, it's a liability. We want them to look at 
wildlife as an asset and for them to see this, they got to have tangible benefits. (Interview 14) 
 
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note the role of the temporal factor, when several interviewees 
pointed out that the benefits need to be provided to the communities within a short period of 
time for the people to support conservation projects. The interviewees report how people have 
had high expectations on KAZA TFCA delivering measures through which people could 
enhance their livelihoods. However, it appears that KAZA TFCA have not fulfilled peoples’ 
expectations when not providing the expected benefits on time which could make them resistant 
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in supporting conservation efforts. This also seems to be highly related to people being poor 
and hence not able to wait for their livelihoods to improve.  
 
[…] So that are all of those expectations from the community that we have to manage. It's a serious challenge 
because they expected so much. They thought KAZA was just going to come in and give them this money to 
start doing their businesses. (Interview 11) 
 
[…] And with the conservation initiative, the conservation projects, you start getting the results after a long 
period of time. Them [the communities] they are expecting results tomorrow. They are saying ‘Okey, yes now 
we have KAZA. KAZA has been established now. So, we want to see the benefits now’. So, it is very difficult 
to go to them and try to tell them that the benefits you are going to see them over time. Because they don’t have 
that patience of time. (Interview 1) 
 
To summarize, it appears that to achieve voluntary compliance, state officials need to establish 
a credible commitment of trust between them and the resource users. In turn, the lack of trust 
in the region seems to be related to the transboundary conservation project not having a 
functional system of benefit-sharing and not delivering these benefits within a reasonable time-
frame, combined with low socioeconomic conditions.  
 
Compliance due to co-management  
Another challenge that KAZA TFCA face in generating compliance is establishing a functional 
system of co-management between state authorities and local communities. The interviews 
describe how the involvement of locals into the management of wildlife and natural resources 
stretching from consultancy to enforcement of rules and user-rights over wildlife and natural 
resources is crucial to make people follow rules. For example, the interviews suggest that if 
people perceive that they are not being consulted before conservation projects are implemented 
this could make them more resistant against following conservation rules. This appears to relate 
to people perceiving that they are not being taken seriously and recognised by state authorities 
when their opinions and knowledge is being rejected.  
 
Because you have to involve the community and show them that you take them seriously. If you come with a 
decision from the top, they'll most likely reject it or they don't give you any support. Most of them understand 
exactly what you're [the state authorities] trying to do and they know there are likely benefits of that but they 
are still resisting because they were never consulted. (Interview 4) 
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People come to the communities and tell them what to do, instead of getting their ideas [the communities] on 
how they need to deal with certain issues. And communities become very resistant because now they are not 
part of that, they are told what to do. (Interview 2) 
 
Furthermore, the interviewees also mention the importance of people having ownership and 
access to wildlife and natural resources when affecting how inclined people will be to follow 
conservation rules. Involvement into the management process which could be both involvement 
in terms of user-rights as well as the mandate to monitor resources themselves, could then give 
people incentives to protect the resources and hence adhere to conservation rules.  
 
Initially when you bring together communities and tell them that: ‘We are giving you the custody or the 
authority to be the custodians of this resource. This resource belongs to you and it is you to decide how you are 
going to manage it.’ And then it is that ownership, that this thing is ours. And then they manage it properly. 
But when you take everything from them and give back to them a law, they always become very radical to an 
extent that every time they see that resource they exploit it. (Interview 1) 
 
If you are not given an incentive - why should I conserve and for who? So, if you are not allowed to cut timber 
I will still cut it and even overharvest and use the wrong methods. Because I'm doing it behind your back and 
this resource is the government's and I don’t care. (Interview 3) 
 
Connected to this, the interviewees reported that a key entry point to make local communities 
follow conservation rules is for the state to establish co-management with traditional authorities 
in the region. In some of the partner countries communities are governed on a local level by 
traditional laws enforced by traditional leaders i.e. the ‘chiefs’. In turn, these traditional 
authorities appear to have high legitimacy among people when taking the local perspective into 
account as well as being in-charge during their whole life-time.  
 
For me, a key entry point into the communities would be through the traditional leaders. That is the key. Because 
when they speak with their subjects they listen. They listen to them because those traditional leaders they are 
always there. They are different from maybe some political leaders who can come and go. (Interview 13) 
 
It is the traditional authorities who understand the needs of their people. So, in most cases where the traditional 
authorities are the ones who have the right over land, we have not had any problems in regards to complying 
with the natural resource policies. But where the state has overruled the traditional authorities and taken control 
of… issuing the land, we have always seen a lot of resistance and labelling of wildlife. Then wildlife not 
becomes their resource but becomes a government thing. (Interview 1)  
 
Altogether, these insights suggest that for people to follow rules within KAZA TFCA, they 
need to be included into the management process over wildlife and natural resources to feel that 
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they are being acknowledged and taken seriously. These accounts could then be related to 
previous theories, arguing that people will perceive that they are treated fairly by state 
authorities when included into management which would increase legitimacy in state 
authorities (Nielsen 2003; Murphy 2004).  
 
Compliance due to distributional and procedural fairness  
Following these insights, these discussed issues connects to previous findings within the 
literature of compliance. However, one striking factor that expands on previous research relates 
to the lack of policy harmonisation between the partner countries, which was uplifted 
throughout the interviews as one of the major challenges for KAZA TFCA. Since the different 
states have not yet (with some few exceptions) succeeded in establishing common policies on 
conservation, the region encompasses different rules on how much people can extract from a 
common resource, where some people are allowed harvesting of resources while others get 
sanctioned for doing the same. The interviewees then describe a situation where it appears that 
the inability of excluding others to extract from the resources together with people being highly 
dependent on wildlife and fishery, makes people participate in the harvesting of the resource 
even though it is illegal on their side of the border. This is in line with collective action theory 
on free-riding, when not being able to exclude others from extraction of the resource; this would 
lower the incentives for cooperation of the resource (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 2002). A good 
example concerns the previous lack of harmonisation between fishing season in the region 
between Namibia and Botswana.  
 
Like you find that during those times people from Botswana would say: 'Why is it like Botswana is saying stop 
fishing but in the other countries they are fishing in the same resource?'. You didn't give people a lot of sense. 
But then both partner countries, they stopped at the same time. Now, everything is fine. People are not 
complaining. Rather people are complying. (Interview 7)  
 
[…] If you are in this side, on the Botswanan side, you see people on the other side in Namibia, and they will 
be fishing in the same water and here they are not allowed to fish. Then because of that we ended up with 
people over-harvest or fishing even outside the season - poaching. (Interview 3) 
 
Policy harmonisation could evidently be an issue in all types of global environmental problems 
with countries having different legislation increasing the risk of free-riding, but in the context 
of transboundary conservation of wildlife the interviews suggests that this is an especially 
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salient mechanism. Fugitive resources such as elephants straddles freely over political borders 
without fences; hence the resource users from one country can see with their own eyes how the 
animal that they have protected is being hunted and killed by the resource users on the other 
side of the border. This is a triggering issue in KAZA TFCA since there is a total hunting-ban 
in Botswana compared to the other countries where hunting of wildlife is allowed.  
 
During dry season, they [the zebras] will come. They will move out to Zalambala. They will go to Namibia. 
Same zebras! And people [in Botswana] will feel that they have just looked after them, but we can’t benefit 
anything from them – why? (Interview 6).  
 
[…] The borders are open and you know, there is free movement of wildlife. Even we share the rivers, we share 
the Chobe River. So, we share the fish, we share the wildlife. In Botswana, we have currently banned hunting. 
But in the neighbouring states it's still open. So, we still have to continue with our mandate of conserving and 
protecting the species which we still share with them. (Interview 4) 
 
It thus appears that different extraction rules could generate an unfair distribution of benefits 
between people in terms of incomes from harvesting resources as well as resource users being 
treated differently by law enforcement authorities working under different legal frameworks. 
These aspects relate to previous theories of compliance suggesting that unfair distribution of 
the outcomes as well as unfair procedures would erode legitimacy in state authorities and in the 
end trust in the state (Sutinen & Kuperan 1999; Levi et al. 2009).  
 
Compliance due to deterrence over political borders  
Finally, even though several normative aspects are uplifted as important for voluntary 
compliance in the region, the interviews further witness of the need to involve deterrence as a 
measure to mitigate poaching, especially commercial poaching. Poaching of ivory and illegal 
trafficking of wildlife products were reported as two of the biggest challenges of KAZA TFCA 
being driven by a global market including a chain of different actors. Hence, since this is an 
issue of global character, involving people from outside the region, the interviews suggested 
that other measures need to be considered as well as working at several different institutional 
levels to mitigate these types of illegal activities.  
 
For communities, incentives will help. Get them involved, let them get more benefit from wildlife, let them 
help you to protect it. Let them stop poaching themselves. For the international syndicates, that's an international 
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problem now where you need assistance from various levels of government. That's something that we are 
grappling with. […] Now, as long as that demand is there, the supply is going to grow. (Interview 14) 
 
In this sense, though sanctions and surveillance are important measures in mitigating poaching 
by people coming from outside the region. This is illustrated in the interviews when 
highlighting how the different legislations between the partner countries combined with 
poachers being able to pass easily over political borders influence where people for commercial 
poaching go about spatially.  
 
[…] in Zimbabwe if someone poaches an elephant, he goes to jail maybe for nine years, and then in Zambia it 
is two or three years. In Botswana, it’s another scenario [suspected poachers are shot on sight by the military]. 
So, it means, when it comes to those illegal activities, these poachers might end up changing from where they 
are getting higher sentences, targeting where they know that 'If I get caught, I'll just spend a year or two years 
and then I'm out'.” (Interview 13) 
 
Again, the harmonisation of policies seems to be an important factor for lowering poaching 
events in the KAZA TFCA but in contrast to mitigating unfair distribution and procedures, here 
it would increase the costs of participating in illegal activities. A real challenge is thus to 
coordinate law-enforcement operations over borders where a functional communication system 
seems to be essential.  
 
There must be a central point for networking communication and one of the challenges is where there are other 
incidents, it happens to areas where the departments or organisations within that particular country cannot 
reach.” (Interview 7) 
 
In addition, working over borders in terms of education and capacity-building among law 
enforcement departments seems to be important in reaching effective surveillance.  
 
The training part is also very important. To share data. So that we train each other and educate each other. Also, 
in terms of resources. We don’t have resources like vehicles, boats for patrolling. Sometimes it’s quite difficult 
because we want to do law enforcement but we don’t have such resources. (Interview 10) 
 
In sum, whether the poacher comes from outside the region and whether rule-breaking is 
connected to the ivory market or more for people’s daily livelihoods, deterrence could play an 
important role in mitigating rule-breaking by people.  
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Discussion of the results 
Following the results from the interviews, several points should be discussed both concerning 
implications for research as well as for policymakers. To start with, covering such a large spatial 
area, voluntary compliance with conservation rules by people in the region plays an immense 
role in avoiding over-harvest of wildlife and natural resources since the deterrence model would 
demand a high amount of resources and capacities. The results support previous research when 
reaching voluntary compliance in a large-scale collective action setting seems to be related to 
establishing trust between state authorities and people in the region. Being ensured a system of 
benefits in return for people abiding from illegal activities is a factor that in turn could influence 
trust in state authorities. This argument relates back to social contract theories (Levi & Stoker 
2000) since state authorities in KAZA TFCA need to establish a credible commitment that they 
will provide benefits to people within the region. Benefit-sharing could then be regarded as a 
potential instrument that can be used in order to increase trust in state authorities. In addition, 
socioeconomic conditions as an underlying variable is evidently something that needs to be 
controlled for when examining compliance with conservation rules. Even though people would 
perceive the rules to be morally right there could be a need to break the rules, when people must 
put food on the table. The study further supports previous theoretical expectations when co-
management between people and higher state authorities seems to increase compliance. It 
appears that the lack of co-management make people feel that they are treated unfairly by state 
authorities. Hence, the causal mechanism at work could be unfair procedures through which 
people are treated by higher state authorities and thus eroding legitimacy in state authorities.  
Together, whether people choose to comply or not in KAZA TFCA do not have 
to be driven by people perceiving the rules as morally wrong or right. Neither the assumption 
that people are only functioning as self-interested rational individuals always calculating the 
costs vs. benefits in rule-breaking can function as the only explanation for compliance in KAZA 
TFCA. Instead, people could have legitimate reasons for not complying with rules when not 
being provided with a functional system of benefit-sharing and co-management. Hence, instead 
of only analysing the individual level in understanding compliance in large-scale commons; 
viewing people as not fulfilling their promises towards the state when not following rules, one 
should rather acknowledge the structural factor when the states have failed in providing a 
common system of benefits and co-management – which could erode trust and to some extent 
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force people to participate in illegal activities. In turn, this highlights the significance of a 
‘functional’ third-party actor to make people follow conservation rules and reaching large-scale 
collective action i.e. the quality of government20 where the lack of an efficient government 
could for example delay the implementation of policies (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya 2015: 12). 
Furthermore, an essential aspect in reaching large-scale collective action over 
wildlife and natural resources is the temporal factor influencing compliance. The interviewees 
describe how people living under tough conditions have short time horizons regarding how long 
they can abide from rule-breaking before new systems, rules and projects are implemented. 
This points towards the significance of institutional change in reaching large-scale collective 
action. Institutions are sticky and often remain in place even though there are mismatches 
between regimes and the socio-ecological system it intends to steer (Young 2010:379). Hence, 
institutional change is often incremental; while formal rules might change overnight through 
political decisions, informal rules such as traditions, customs and rules of conduct are harder to 
change and more resistant to new policies (North 1990:6). As a large-scale management system 
with actors from different countries including both formal and traditional rules; KAZA TFCA 
have problems with a lagging effect when the results from the efforts taken by the political elite 
will probably show at the local level only after some time. Consequently, Sutinen & Kuperan 
(1999:182) argue that inefficiency in terms how fast higher authorities respond to a given 
problem erode legitimacy, which could then be the case with state authorities in KAZA TFCA. 
In this sense, the temporal factor could change the function of the factors vertical trust and co-
management in this large-scale setting. For example, slow institutional change (through the 
differences in formal and informal rules) could make it harder to establish functional systems 
of benefit-sharing and co-management, which could then lower legitimacy and trust in state 
authorities mitigating compliance. Hence, theories on compliance by resource users should be 
expanded acknowledging the effect of the temporal factor in reaching large-scale collective 
action over natural resources. 
Another way of understanding this relationship between provision of benefits, 
fulfilling expectations and state authorities receiving the support of resources users, could be 
                                                
20 Although out of the scope of the study, in short, quality of government could involve several components e.g. 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality and level of corruption. See Kaufman et al. 2009 for a more in-depth 
discussion.  
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related to the interesting findings from the work by Kadt & Lieberman (2015). Focusing on 
African countries, the authors argue that when citizens are being provided with basic public 
services by the government, expectations are raised upward on the governmental party. Thus, 
instead of citizens giving the support to the government, citizens cast their vote on other parties 
if the government cannot fulfil their new ‘higher’ expectations. In this light, people’s resistance 
against conservation projects in KAZA TFCA can be understood to some degree. The whole 
project has been promoted with the goal to uplift the livelihoods of the communities, which in 
turn could have increased the expectations of KAZA TFCA as a provider of benefits. Hence, 
as people’s higher expectations are not fulfilled they could become less supportive of rules. 
Whether this is the case or not in KAZA TFCA, it is an important perspective to investigate 
further in the field of large-scale collective action as the vertical relationship between the state 
providing public services and receiving support from people does not seem to be that evident 
as one can assume.  
Equally important is the role of local institutions in reaching large-scale collective 
action over wildlife and natural resources, which are in line with an emerging literature focusing 
on the role of local political institutions in Africa on different welfare parameters (see for 
example Wig & Tollefsen 2016; Knutsen et al. 2016). The results from the statistical analysis 
give some support to how people’s trust in local authorities as well as how corruption in local 
authorities could erode compliance with forestry rules. Hence, the variation in local institutions 
in terms of informal norms of trust in local authorities as well as corrupt behaviour among 
public officials could play a part in reaching large-scale collective action when eroding 
compliance. This also concerns the legitimacy of traditional authorities. Although a debated 
field on the relationship between democratic leaders vs. traditional authorities21 the interviews 
describe how traditional authorities seems to have high legitimacy by the local communities; 
thus, being an important link between state authorities and resource users.  
The study further expands on previous research when illustrating how the 
management over large-scale commons such as rivers, wildlife and habitats straddling over 
political borders, compared to small-scale commons, demands a coordination between law 
enforcement departments as well as harmonisation of policies over political borders. Otherwise, 
                                                
21 See Logan 2009 for an in-depth discussion 
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there is a risk of inducing free-riding among resource-users. Free-riding is not only a threat for 
the sustainability of wildlife, forestry and fishery stocks but could also intensify rule-breaking. 
If some people can get away with poaching or as in the case of KAZA TFCA, where some 
people can extract from the common resources while others cannot, according to Kuperan & 
Sutinen (1998:330), this could erode morality among people, when the regulation is perceived 
as unfair and further not effectively protecting the resources, making people legitimise them 
also extracting from the common resource. This unfair distribution of benefits and unfair 
procedures through which rules are implemented would then erode the legitimacy of state 
authorities (Tyler 1990; Sutinen & Kuperan 1999). Hence, the management system should be 
consistent rather than flexible over political borders. Thus, in a large-scale collective action 
setting, the different state authorities need to be aware of the consequences of rules in relation 
to distribution of benefits from the resources to the resource users as well as procedural fairness 
by enforcement authorities. Hence, previous theories should be developed on how the 
differences in formal extraction rules between states could cause free-riding among resource 
users and further gain more in-depth knowledge on the causal mechanisms at work i.e. 
distributional and procedural fairness.   
 Finally, from the results it appears that the effectiveness of deterrence could be 
dependent on type of illegal activities as well as type of poacher. The combination of wildlife 
straddling over a large area, together with commercial poaching being connected to a global 
market of ivory suggests that deterrence in terms of surveillance and sanctions by state 
authorities is needed. The market for ivory makes people from outside come to the region for 
poaching of ivory – people whom are not steered by social norms of trust and reciprocity 
towards other resource-users or trust in the state that would induce voluntary compliance. 
Monitoring these fugitive resources such as elephants over borders clearly is a costly endeavour 
relating back to the role of resource characteristics as affecting the role of surveillance and 
monitoring and the need to involve a third-party enforcer. Regarding stationary resources such 
as forestry, this would probably be an easier task for local people to monitor while commercial 
poaching of elephants obviously demands higher enforcement authorities and better capacities 
for surveillance. In this sense, deterrence might be more important as a complement to ‘softer 
measures’ in achieving compliance in large-scale commons with fugitive resources and actors 
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involved whom are not steered by social norms of trust and reciprocity, demanding high 
monitoring capacities that only the state could provide for.  
Together, the results from this study indicate how the linkage of institutions both 
horizontally and vertically is a fundamental aspect in reaching compliance by resource users 
and thus achieving large-scale collective action over wildlife and natural resources. Local 
communities need to be included into the management process and consulted for them to 
support rules, while at the same time being dependent on higher state authorities in coordination 
of rules, enforcement, surveillance and provision of benefit-sharing systems. Furthermore, as 
in the case of KAZA TFCA, large-scale collective action over wildlife and natural resources 
includes not one, but several different state authorities. This study has shown how essential the 
coordination and collaboration between state authorities are in terms of policy harmonisation 
and effective law enforcement, which could influence resource users trust and legitimacy in 
state authorities and their perceived risks of participating in illegal activities. Furthermore, the 
emergence of social norms of trust and reciprocity between resource users are harder to achieve 
due to the large spatial distance thus, linking communities horizontally over borders who share 
the same resources – through forums or workshops is also a way forward in reaching large-
scale collective action.  
Overall, this relates to the theoretical idea of polycentric systems i.e. systems that 
comprehends multiple governing authorities at different scales, from local to international 
which are nested in one another, as a way of dealing with ‘global’ environmental problems 
(Ostrom 2010:552; Mansbridge 2014:10). The challenge lies in as Schoon (2013:426) states 
“[…] how to make the decisions of where and when to scale up”. In this sense, policy-makers 
needs to pay bigger attention to adaptive governance when dealing with resources that demand 
large-scale collective action i.e. building a functional system that promotes institutional 
diversity (recognising both formal rules and organisations as well as informal norms and 
practices), the exchange of ideas and knowledge, the building of trust through repeated 
interaction, and a strong leadership (Schoon 2013; Ostrom 2010). Transboundary institutions 
could in this way function as facilitators in creating forums for information-sharing, capacity-
building and consultancy both between state departments as well as between resource users in 
different countries. Hence, although there are many challenges in generating compliance over 
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large-scale common-pool resources there are also several opportunities when possible learning 
effects and collaborations over borders can be facilitated through transboundary organisations.   
 
 
Generalizability of the results 
Being a case-study one should further reflect on how the findings from this context could be 
applied to other settings. Is it possible to apply the results to other types of large-scale collective 
action dilemmas such as taxpaying or issues relating to climate change? Following the results, 
the context of this case could limit the extent to which the findings could be generalized since 
socio-economic conditions play a great part in making people follow rules. Thus, moving to a 
setting where socioeconomic conditions would be different might lead to other findings. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that many large-scale collective action dilemmas comprehend the 
same inherent structures as transboundary conservation such as a many heterogeneous users 
with a large-spatial distance between them, being dependent on a third-party actor that could 
ensure compliance with rules. In this sense, some of the factors identified here could potentially 
be found in other settings of large-sale collective action as well. Although, these questions could 
only be answered through further studies in other contexts.  
 
 
Concluding remarks  
To conclude, the overall aim of the study was to identify how and why different factors 
influence compliance with conservation rules by resource-users in large-scale commons such 
as transboundary conservation and thereby understanding how large-scale collective action can 
be achieved. This study has shown that both previous factors related to the normative strand as 
well as factors of the deterrence model are important in reaching compliance in large-scale 
commons, while also providing insights into how other dimensions could influence compliance 
in a setting of large collective action such as transfrontier conservation schemes.  
Compared to the qualitative part, the statistical analysis can identify patterns in 
and how the local variation in trust and corruption could have implications in achieving large-
scale collective action. The study give some support to previous theories that corruption and 
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trust in local authorities could impact levels of compliance in transboundary conservation since 
lowered trust and increased levels of corruption generated increased deforestation in KAZA 
TFCA. Hence, dealing with large-scale commons that stretches over several states and thus a 
variety of local political institutions, could demand different compliance strategies depending 
on local variation in trust and corruption. However, these results need further confirmation 
through data with better coverage and reliability. Nevertheless, the qualitative analysis supports 
some of the findings from the statistical analysis and previous expectations that vertical trust, 
in this case through the establishment of benefit-sharing, is important in reaching voluntary 
compliance in this large-scale setting. Furthermore, co-management between state authorities 
and local communities also appears to be essential for compliance by resource users. The 
qualitative part further suggest that the function of these factors could be somewhat different in 
transboundary conservation. Slow institutional change through the divergence between formal 
rules taken by state authorities and informal norms and traditional customs could make it harder 
to establish functional systems of benefit-sharing and co-management, which could then lower 
trust in state authorities mitigating compliance. Hence, theories on compliance by resource 
users should be expanded acknowledging the effect of the temporal factor in reaching large-
scale collective action over natural resources. What is equally important to highlight is how 
socio-economic conditions affect people’s willingness to follow rules. Even though people 
perceive rules as morally right, they might be forced to participate in illegal activities because 
of their subsistence needs. Overall, instead of viewing individuals as not fulfilling their promise 
towards the states when breaking rules, policy-makers need to acknowledge structural factors 
as drivers of rule-breaking by resource users in transboundary conservation – when the states 
have not yet fulfilled their promise on delivering a functional system of benefit-sharing and co-
management.  
 In contrast to small-scale commons within one community or country solely, 
reaching large-scale collective action in transboundary conservation demands a coordination 
and harmonisation of policies between countries. Otherwise conflicts can arise due to different 
distribution of benefits from the resources and people perceiving that they are treated differently 
by state authorities, which could erode trust and legitimacy, inducing rule-breaking. Previous 
theories should thereby expand on how different formal rules in terms of extraction and 
harvesting of resources between states could cause free-riding among resource users since this 
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seems to be a triggering issue in transboundary conservation and an obstacle in reaching large-
scale collective action. Higher state authorities further need to have the knowledge in the 
variation in and structure of local institutions such as traditional leaders and rules, since they 
are important in generating compliance and in the end an effective implementation of 
conservation projects in transboundary conservation.  
 Finally, although the study demonstrates that ‘softer measures’ such as benefit-
sharing and inclusion of resource-users is fundamental to reach voluntary compliance in large-
scale commons, deterrence measures are also necessary. However, this study suggests that the 
effectiveness of deterrence could be dependent on type of illegal activities as well as type of 
poacher. In the case of KAZA TFCA, commercial poaching of ivory seems to attract people 
from outside that are not steered through social norms of trust and reciprocity; hence deterrence 
might be a more effective measure in this case. Nevertheless, for the deterrence model to be 
successful, enforcement authorities need to coordinate enforcement strategies horizontally over 
political borders since differing sanctions between countries together with open borders could 
make people more inclined to participate in illegal activities traveling where sanctions are 
lower. Together, this study indicates that the linkage of institutions in terms of consultancy, 
information-sharing and coordination of rules both horizontally between communities and state 
departments over borders, as well as vertically between local resource-users and higher 
enforcement authorities plays an immense role for compliance with rules by resource users and 
hence reaching large-scale collective action over wildlife and natural resources.  
Following the results of the study there are several directions for future research. 
To increase the generalizability of the results these factors should be further explored in other 
transboundary conservation areas or other large-scale collective action dilemmas. Overall, this 
study has not been able to control for differences in contextual factors such as political systems 
or other aspects of quality of government than corruption, and their effect on compliance which 
is something that could develop this field further.  Future research would also gain a lot from 
focusing solely on one of the factors identified in the material. For example, the differences in 
distribution of benefits and procedural fairness through the lack of policy coordination, where 
research could focus on how cooperation could be achieved between e.g. law enforcement 
departments. In addition, the statistical analysis suggests that corruption in local authorities 
migth be a salient factor influencing compliance in this transboundary setting. However, this is 
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a theme that demands its own approach and focus as it is sensitive issue to discuss. Regarding 
level of analysis, future studies should evidently include resource users and their perceptions 
on the issue through for example questionnaires in different communities to complement the 
insights from this study. Finally, finding statistical data with better coverage and reliability is 
essential to complement the qualitative data to a greater extent and thus being able to track 
patterns over time and over larger units of analysis. 
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Appendix  
Map KAZA TFCA 
 
Source:	Peace	Parks	Foundation	2016	
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Correlation matrix 
 
Tree Cover Loss 
& 2010-2016 
Trust Local 
Government 
Trust Court Corruption Police 
Corruption 
Local 
Government 
Tree Cover Loss & 
2010-2016 
1     
Trust Local 
Government 
-0.016 1    
Trust Court 0.466** 0.261 1   
Corruption Police 0.475** 0.261 0.259 1  
Corruption Local 
Government 
0.224 0.291 0.430* 0.312 1 
Source: Afrobarometer round 2008/2009; Hansen et al. 2013. Comment: Standard Error in parentheses, significant level: 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. To make the results easier to interpret, the variables concerning trust i.e. “How much do you trust 
each of the following or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?; Your Elected Local Government Council/Court” were 
recoded were 0 equals “A lot” and 3 equals “Not at all”.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 61 
Interview guide 
Title? 
Country of origin? 
Authority and tasks? 
Employment history (how many years and on other positions)? 
 
MOTIVATION/RATIONALE BEHIND KAZA TFCA 
• How would you define the overall objective of the conservation area? 
o Some conservation areas focus primarily on biodiversity outcomes, others 
emphasize other needs more strongly. How do you strike the balance? 
 
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION 
• What are the main challenges involved in the international cooperation in respect to 
the TFCA? 
• To what extent do the involved states comply with the international agreements? 
• Do the involved states benefit to the same extent? 
• Do you perceive transboundary conservation initiatives to be more effective than 
strictly national parks and national conservation? Or more challenging? Why or why 
not? 
• To what extent are the policies of the involved countries harmonized?  
o How do the involved states work towards harmonization of their policies? 
o What are the main obstacles? 
• Are all national authorities able to prosecute citizens from the other nations? 
• Will a poacher be extradited or tried in the country where the offence is carried out? 
o How do the involved states work towards harmonization of their policies? 
o What are the main obstacles? 
 
THE TFCA AND ITS RELATION TO NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
• Is the overall enforcement strategy and the capacities for implementing this strategy 
primarily “owned” by the TFCA or is it rather decided by the respective countries? 
• How do the varying strategies and available resources in the different countries affect 
the overall effectiveness?  
o Is the TFCA more “successful” in some countries?  
• Do you feel constrained by national ministries and departments? To what extent do 
you feel autonomous? 
• The master integrated development plan discusses the fact that there is variation in the 
management and conservation of natural resources between the five partner countries:  
o How do these differences play out?  
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o What are the consequences of these differences? 
o How could they, in your opinion, be overcome?  
NATIONAL LEVEL DYNAMICS 
• Are there different implementation challenges in the different countries?  
o What are the main implementation challenges? 
• Are there conflicts between state institutions and traditional rule or local communities 
that impacts on the success of conservation? 
• Is it more difficult to enforce TFCA rules on lands with certain type of ownership 
arrangements? 
• Do you believe that the TFCA increases the conservation capacities of the involved 
countries? Why? 
• Consider hypothetically that the rangers of one involved country are less committed 
on approaching poachers. Do you think such behavior make rangers from other 
involved countries to also less committed? Or do they learn in fact to commit and 
approach poachers themselves? Can you give any examples? Does behavior travel 
from countries with more committed rangers to countries with less committed staff or, 
vice versa, does behavior from countries with less committed people travel to states 
with committed staff? 
• Does the success of the TFCA depend heavily on the national bureaucratic capacities?  
Is there variation across the involved countries? Do you have examples? 
 
LOCAL LEVEL COOPERATION 
• Do you perceive that the local communities appreciate the TFCA?  
o Does the level of “support” vary across the involved countries?  
o Does it vary within the TFCA and its various types of protection schemes?  
o If so, can you explain why this varies? 
• Do you perceive that local communities trust TFCA officials? 
o More so than national institutions?  
• Are locals involved in deciding the rules in the TCFA? 
• Are locals involved in making sure that people follow the rules? 
• Is this more common in some areas of the TFCA? 
• What are the benefits and potential problems with involving locals in enforcement to a 
larger extent? 
• If locals are involved in enforcing rules, do you think that these locals will be hard on 
poachers or will they let people poach freely? 
• Are locals themselves willing to comply with rules and regulations? 
o Do they trust the rangers? Do they trust that the rangers implement and enforce 
policies impartially? 
• What, in your opinion, are the most effective means to ensure the compliance of / 
support from local communities? 
• How can the legitimacy of the TFCA be enhanced even further? 
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• The master integrated development plan describes that human-wildlife conflict is 
believed to be widespread:  
o How does this play out?  
o What are the consequences?  
o And what is done to reduce these kinds of conflict? 
 
ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES AND CAPACITIES 
• How many rangers are working in the TFCA? 
• What mandate do rangers have? 
• Are they employed by the TFCA or by their respective national 
ministries/governments? 
o Do they receive common training? If so, what type of education (i.e. policing, 
conservation ecology training etc.). 
o Do the rangers cross borders and cooperate between the countries? 
o What equipment do they have at their disposal? 
o What mandate do they have? Do they make arrests? 
o What happens if poaching is encountered? What are the sanctions? Can you 
describe such a typical procedure? 
o Can a national legal system convict perpetrators from other countries? 
o Are there types of poaching of “minor scale” that is not punished by rangers? 
o Tell us about the “joint poaching strategy plan” and the existence of a “wildlife 
crime prevention unit”: Are they being implemented? In all countries? 
• Is it difficult to recruit rangers? 
• What type of motives do you think attracts rangers to such positions? 
• How would you describe the security situation facing the rangers? 
• What is being done to ensure and enhance the commitment and loyalty of the rangers 
to the TFCA:s conservation objectives? 
 
COMPLIANCE AND BIODIVERSITY OUTCOMES 
• How would you, yourself, define “effectiveness” of a TFCA? How would you define 
“success”? 
• How does KAZA monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the TFCA? 
o Do the KAZA staff survey the animals? Other biodiversity outcomes? 
Conservation targets? 
• What, in your perception, are the most effective means to foster compliance with rules 
and regulations? 
• The master integrated development plan identifies poaching as a common problem:  
o How common do you perceive it to be?  
o What type of poaching is most frequent?  
o Who is the typical perpetrator? 
o Is it more frequent in certain areas of the park? 
o How do the poachers go about? 
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o Have there, in your opinion, been any changes in levels of poaching during 
recent years? 
o Do you have a record of poaching events? Number of arrests and convictions? 
o How would you define the causes/drivers behind this problem? Who are the 
actors involved? Who benefits?  
o What is currently being done to combat poaching?  
o What would, ideally, be done to combat poaching? 
o Given the current challenge of poaching, what is the way ahead:  
§ Is it increasing tough sanctions? Would higher penalties make a 
difference? 
§ Is it to design other, more “soft” policies?  
§ Is it even making poaching completely legal? 
CONCLUDING	REFLECTIONS	
• How would you define the main challenges facing the TFCA? 
o How are these challenges being addressed? What would the solution to the 
identified problems look like? 
o Are there reforms that have worked? Can you give examples?  
o Were some reforms less successful? Can you give examples? 
o Why did the reforms not work?  
Do you see problem as one of resources (lack of rangers) or one of people’s 
attitudes to others’ behavior? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65 
Overview respondents from interviews 
Interview 1  31-01-2017 Botswana 
Interview 2  31-01-2017 Botswana 
Interview 3  01-02-2017 Botswana 
Interview 4  01-02-2017 Botswana 
Interview 5 01-02-2017 Botswana 
Interview 6  01-02-2017 Botswana 
Interview 7  01-02-2017 Botswana 
Interview 8  02-02-2017 Zimbabwe 
Interview 9  02-02-2017 Zimbabwe 
Interview 10  02-02-2017 Zimbabwe 
Interview 11  04-02-2017 Zambia 
Interview 12  04-02-2017 Zimbabwe 
Interview 13  04-02-2017 Zimbabwe 
Interview 14  04-02-2017 Zimbabwe 
Interview 15  05-02-2017 Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
